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Abstract: Since Akerlof’s theory of a market for lemons, economists have viewed quality uncertainty 
as an informational advantage for sellers. Drawing on frontier techniques, we propose in this paper a 
simple method to measure inefficiency of both sellers and buyers in markets for goods with different 
levels  of  quality.  We  apply  our  non-parametric  double-frontier  framework  to  the  case  of  illicit 
substance markets, which suffer from imperfect information about the drug quality for purchasers and 
to a lesser extent for sellers. We use unique data on cannabis and cocaine transactions collected in 
France that include information about price, quantity exchanged and purity. We find that transactional 
inefficiency  does  not  really  benefit  either  dealers  or  purchasers.  Information  influences  the 
performance of agents during market transactions, sales in the street being more inefficient than sales 
made in other places.  
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1. Introduction 
  Since the “invisible hand” of Adam Smith, a large part of economic literature has focused on 
price formation in competitive markets. From a neo-classical viewpoint, prices result from supply and 
demand  interactions  in  the  markets.  Prices  can  be  seen  as  a  signalling  mechanism  that  provides 
incentives for market operators to respond and remedy any imbalances. Examples are numerous and 
indicate that the price mechanism is a ruthlessly efficient organizer. 
Economic theory teaches us that price is unique on a given competitive market. But with the 
exception  of  auction  markets  and  a  few  others  satisfiying  the  conditions  for  perfect  competition, 
everyday life indicates that markets are not competitive, nor the price unique (Pratt et al., 1979, Walsh 
and Whelan, 1999). This is especially the case in markets with products of different quality levels. 
Since Akerlof’s (1970) seminal contribution on the market for lemons, economists have been aware of 
potential for adverse selection in markets when information is asymmetric between transactors. 
In  situations  where  true  quality  remains  undistinguishable  by  consumers  before  purchase, 
there is a probability that sellers set excessive prices for poor quality products and have incentives to 
offer only low-quality goods. As a consequence, markets should not exist in many situations involving 
quality  uncertainty.  Fortunately,  there  also  exist  simple  strategies  for  sellers  offering  high-quality 
goods to inform their clients, and thus to protect buyers from adverse selection (see for instance Lewis, 
2010)
1. 
  Illicit substances are very good examples of products for which  customers face difficulties in 
assessing the quality of the product purchased at the moment of the transaction.  As pointed out by 
Caulkins and Reuters (1998) and Caulkins (2007), drugs are differentiated by purity and there is large 
uncertainty on quality. In many cases, only effective consumption of the drug purchased will help to 
obtain this information. Interestingly, at the retail level, there may also be problems of information for 
sellers, for instance when dealers obtain secondhand products cut with unknown additives. Illicit drugs 
are thus sometimes considered as  “double experience goods” (Caulkins, 2007). The purpose of our 
contribution is to develop a general framework to study the performance of buyers and sellers in 
markets with quality heterogeneity, with an application to illicit drug markets. 
A consequence of these informational difficulties is that for a given level of quality, price 
dispersion is expected to be larger in illicit drugs markets than in any other markets. Considering the 
price-purity ratio of illicit drugs in the US over the period 1980-2000, Reuter and Caulkins (2004) find 
a greater variability than that observed in legal goods markets like beer, sugar, coffee or fuel oil. 
Interestingly, these variations in drug prices (quality and quantity being held constant) are the result of 
differences in efficiency of buyers and sellers involved in transactions. For instance, sellers with better 
information than clients may exploit this informational advantage and set excessive prices, as shown 
                                                           
1 Lewis (2010) shows for instance that for online auctions of used goods sellers disclose their private information through 
text and photos on the auction webpage. Results from auctions of used cars in the US indicate that online disclosures 
strongly influence prices.  
   
in the case of housing transactions by Levitt and Syverson (2008).
2 Those agents receiving larger 
revenues when selling a product of a given quality would behave in a more efficient way.  
At the same time, dealers may be interested in setting reasonable prices by offering a discount 
in order to build up customer loyalty. There may hence be some reasons to believe that despite their 
informational advantage due to quality uncertainty, it is profitable for sellers in certain circumstances 
to share a part of their informational with their customers. It is certainly a very bad commercial 
strategy to be very efficient (by setting high prices for a given quality ) with regular consumers as the 
latter could be tempted to turn to other drug dealers. Conversely, selling drugs to very inexperienced 
consumers encountered only once can open the door to the temptation of offering drug doses of very 
poor quality (for a given price) or at very high prices (for a given quality). In any case, information 
should strongly influence the efficiency of sellers and purchasers in market transactions.  
  In this paper, we examine the performance of both buyers and sellers in drug mark ets using 
unique data on cannabis and cocaine transactions carried out in France in 2005 and 2006. The key 
feature of these data is that they include information on both quantity purchased and total price as well 
as on true quality (purity) for each transaction. We see efficient sellers as those who obtain the highest 
price per gram of drug for a given level of quality and efficient buyers as those who pay the lowest 
price per gram of drug for a given level of quality. Of course, we account for the negative relationship 
between quantity purchased and the price paid per gram of drug through possible bulk-buy discounts. 
To study efficiency of buyers and sellers, we draw on non-parametric frontier techniques and consider 
a double-frontier framework with price, quality and quantity as variables of interest. 
When analyzing the data, we find evidence of large variations in the price paid per gram of 
drug for a given level of quality. Results from our performance analysis of agents in drug markets 
indicate that  transactional inefficiency does not really benefit either dealers or purchasers. For 
cannabis resin, the price set by buyers could be 48% higher on average while the price paid by buyers 
could be 41% lower on average. We also explain efficiency scores using two-stage truncated estimates 
following Silmar and Wilson (2007). Two results of interest are that total inefficiency per transaction 
increases with drug quality and inefficiency is greater when the drug is purchased in the street rather 
than in other places . This shows that information strongly influences the performance of agents 
involved in transactions in illicit substance markets.  
  The remainder of our contribution is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review 
some features characterizing the   markets for illicit drugs. We describe our data on cannabis and 
cocaine transactions concerning a sample of French drug users in Section 3. We present a non -
parametric double-frontier framework to study inefficiency of buyers and sellers in a market in Section 
4. We discuss the results of our empirical analysis in Section 5, with some evidence of the magnitude 
                                                           
2  Real estate agents have much more detailed information on housing markets than their clients.  They thus have an 
incentive to convince them to sell their houses too cheaply and too quickly. Using US data, Levitt and Syverson (2008) find 
that homes owned by real estate agents are sold at higher prices on average than other houses.  
   
of individual inefficiency on markets and on the factors influencing the performance of buyers and 
sellers. Finally, concluding comments are placed in Section 6. 
 
2. Behavior in illicit drug markets 
  Empirically,  the  classic  negative  effect  of  price  on  consumption  that  is  emphasized  by 
standard economic theory is much more difficult to assess when considering illicit drug markets. This 
occurs because of the difficulty in obtaining good information on consumption and prices, in a context 
where transactions are illegal (see Horowitz, 2001, Van Ours and Pudney, 2006). However, a review 
of  the scarce empirical  literature  indicates  that  for all illicit  substances consumption  significantly 
decreases with price.
3 For instance, large values of price elasticity have been reported by Van Ours 
(1995) for opium (e= -1), by Rhodes et al. (2002) for marijuana (e= -2.8) and by Grossman and 
Chaloupka (1998) for marijuana once addiction is taken into account (e=-1.3 in the short term and e=-
2 in the long term). 
  Since drug transactions are by definition illegal, the dynamics of prices on these markets is 
strongly affected by the level of law enforcement. Prices should be h igher when there are more 
important legal penalties for individuals caught while selling drugs or when there are more police 
officers in the streets (because of the increased probability of being arrested). These price increases 
would reflect the risk premium of sellers whose activity becomes more risky. At the retail level, drug 
dealers facing a sporadic financial shortage due to price increase still have the possibility of cuttting 
the product they intend to sell to a greater degree, in order to keep thei r benefits unchanged. 
Accounting for purity when studying drug transactions is hence a crucial issue as drug quality may be 
seen as an adjustment variable (Arkes et al., 2004, Caulkins, 1994, Rhodes et al., 1994, Reuter and 
Caulkins, 2004).  
  A consequence of the dealers’ behavior at the retail level is that purchasers will encounter 
difficulties in assessing the quality of the drug at the time of the transaction. In fact, many authors 
have highlighted the fact that consumers may only really know the quality of the product they have 
bought after the purchase (Reuter and Caulkins, 2004). Caulkins (2007) even goes one step further by 
qualifying illicit drugs as “double experience goods.” While consumers have imperfect information on 
the quality they purchase, dealers may also be ignorant of the purity of the drugs they sell. This occurs 
because dealers very often sell secondhand products whose true quality is not always known. The 
information problem on quality sold is magnified when retailers themselves cut the drug with additives 
to make more profits. Nevertheless, sellers have much better expectations than purchasers of the purity 
of the drug they are selling based on personal information (through the source of the product or their 
relationship with their wholesaler).  
                                                           
3 Exceptions are DiNardo (1993) for cocaine and Desimone and Farrelly (2003) for marijuana in the US. For a recent survey 
of price elasticity in drug markets, see Ben Lakhdar et al. (2010).  
   
  Because of imperfect information on quality, illicit drugs markets have all the characteristics 
to become a market for lemons. However, this does not happen. According to Reuter and Caulkins 
(2004), sellers still have incentives to behave in an honest way especially when there are many illicit 
drug dealers in competition. By cutting the product they sell, dealers would acquire a bad reputation. 
Transactions  may  be  seen  as  repeated  games  taking  place  between  sellers  and  purchasers.  This 
precludes the former from offering too low a quality product to their customers. Otherwise, buyers 
would be abused only once and would turn afterwards to more honest dealers. The quest of drug users 
is undoubtedly to meet dealers who are able to offer them a drug of high quality at a fair price. Finally, 
this phenomenon is not very different from that observed in some legal markets like wine (Landon and 
Smith, 1998). 
  The few existing studies on the supply side confirm that profits made by sellers at the retail 
level are close to zero, even if earnings gained from drug dealing in the street are higher than the 
minimum wage that could be obtained by these workers given their education and qualification levels 
(Reuter et al., 1990, Berg and Andersen, 1993, Wilkins and Sweetsur, 2006).
4 Using detailed data on 
the financial activities of a drug-selling street gang in the US, Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) report that 
street-level drug activities produce limited earnings, from 6$ to 11$ per hour. Nevertheless, the 
distribution of earnings is highly skewed and gang leaders benefit from large incomes. 
  All these features are expected to strongly affect the behavior of both sellers and consumers in 
drug markets. As in any other markets, agents are expected to maximize their own level of satisfaction 
through the transactions. On the one hand, buyers will try to minimize the price per gram of drug they 
pay, for a given level of quality. On the other hand, sellers will try to maximize their own profits by 
setting a high price per gram of drug for a given quality. However, as previously discussed, the true 
quality (purity) of the drug is likely to be imperfectly known on the demand side and to a lower extent 
on the supply side.  
Inefficient selling or purchase behaviors are thus likely   to emerge as a consequence of 
imperfect information. For instance, consumers anticipating a high quality in the product they are 
buying could be ready to pay an excessive price with respect to its true quality. Of course, several 
other factors could contribute to inefficient decisions. On the demand side, addicted users being in an 
urgent need of an illicit substance will certainly be ready to pay an above -market price for their dose 
of drug. Irregular users having few interactions with dealers are likely  to be less documented on 
current market prices and are therefore likely to buy products of lower quality at a high price. And 
more generally, one cannot observe the marginal advantages curve of consumers, nor the true 
opportunity cost they support. 
On the supply side, for a given quality, some dealers may be interested in setting drug prices 
temporarily below standard market levels to make buyers addicted. The loss of income generated by 
                                                           
4 On the supply side, Caulkins (1997) presents a model of a drug dealer’s decision about how many customers to supply.  
   
such sales in the short run would be more compensated by the expected increased benefits in the long 
run if dealers decided after a while to offer the same high-quality drug at higher prices. Sellers may 
also keep their prices at the current level, but decide to manipulate quality. Assuming that quality is 
positively correlated with price, sellers could make a discount by offering a product of better quality in 
order  to  increase  consumption  of  more  concentrated  drugs.  Again,  such  strategy  is  expected  to 
generate additional profits in the long run. 
As a consequence, there should be large variations in prices on drug markets for a given level 
of true quality. Since each market transaction involves by definition one purchaser and one seller, it is 
possible  to  study  the  performance  of  these  agents.  Are  dealers  more  efficient  on  average  than 
purchasers  when  selling  their  drugs?  We  investigate  this  issue  using  a  unique  data  set  on  drug 
transactions combining information on price, quantity and purity. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics on drug transactions in France 
  Our data were collected by the French National Identification System for Drugs and Other 
Substances (SINTES). SINTES is a scheme whose aim is to gather information on synthetic drugs 
through both Police and Customs’ seizures (Giraudon and Bello, 2007). This system, which is coupled 
with the TREND network of the French Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (OFDT), 
now provides information on all types of illicit drugs in France.
5 TREND is a system structured 
around  local  coordination  networks  that  have  a  common  str ategy  of  collecting  and  analyzing 
information. In 2008, the network included seven large cities spread over the metropolitan territory 
(Bordeaux, Lille, Marseille, Metz, Paris, Rennes and Toulouse). 
  The TREND scheme investigates the behavior of illicit drug users through local observations 
from places such as reception and harm reduction support centers for drug users, and techno music 
festivals. Centers have permanent contact with active users and they will mainly concern the more 
vulnerable consumers. Conversely, places like free parties, rave parties and nightclubs will cover more 
often well-integrated members of society and they offer opportunities to learn about new forms of 
drug use. In both cases, it should be kept in mind that the focus is made on s pecific groups that over-
consume illicit substances compared to the rest of the population.  
  In what follows, we draw on two data sets collected from users of cannabis and cocaine 
respectively through the SINTES-TREND system. The main purpose of these surveys was to monitor 
the toxicity of substances found in France, but they also provide detailed information on the context of 
drug purchase and use. The sample collection procedure draws on local coordinators of the TREND 
network. These coordinators are soc ial street workers, people involved in techno -music events, 
students, volunteers in charities dealing with prevention and harm reduction, or nurses and doctors 
                                                           
5 TREND is the French acronym of “Emerging Trends and New Drugs.” See www.ofdt.fr for an overview of the French 
monitoring system of illicit drugs phenomena.  
   
working in needle-exchange programs (Giraudon and Bello, 2007). Since the survey is by definition 
about illicit drugs, standard techniques of sampling were not applicable in this context. 
  As a preliminary step, a fixed number of questionnaires to complete was set for each city of 
the survey. Within each city, a requirement for collectors was to promote the variability of drug users 
interviewed. The logic was to carry out data collection in a variety of places and settings, for instance 
by contacting consumers with different socio-economic backgrounds or users buying drugs in different 
districts of the city. This was done to avoid collecting drug samples from a very limited number of 
retailers. For each drug user contacted, the interviewer had to both fill in a questionnaire and purchase 
a sample of drug from the transaction with a drug dealer or retailer documented by the consumer in the 
survey. These samples were then sent to a laboratory for chemical analysis. 
  Each collector received a fixed sum of money after sending a drug sample.
6 The price paid to 
the collector (and in turn to the consumer) was  much above the average market price, meaning that 
drug users had an incentive to sell a small amount of their product. For cannabis, each interviewer had 
to collect at least one gram given constraints on toxicological analysis and the fixed payment was set  
at 25 euros per sample. For cocaine, the sample collected had to exceed 0.1 gram and the lump -sum 
payment was set at 60 euros. Note that there were no legal repercussions for participants who took part 
in the survey as collectors were generally known to drug users. At the same time, like any other drug 
users in France, participants (but not surveyors)  could be arrested by the police in case of illicit drug 
detention. 
  Each questionnaire provides detailed information about the drug transaction from the drug  
dealer or retailer corresponding to the sample collected. This includes the total price paid by the user  
along with the quantity of drug purchased. The data comprise a unique measure of true quality, 
stemming from a purity analysis through a toxicological  analysis. Quality is respectively the THC 
concentration  (percentage  of  ∆-9-tetrahydrocannabinod)  for  cannabis  and  the  percentage  of  pure 
cocaine for cocaine. There are also a few other characteristics related to the product: origin, location of 
the deal as well as expected and realized effects from the substance consumption. Finally, the survey 
includes a brief description of the drug user: gender, age, years of experience in drug consumption, 
level of education and occupation. However, there is no information on individual income in the 
questionnaire.  
  Let us now describe the two samples. The survey on cannabis users was conducted in 2005 on 
391 consumers. We decide to drop respondents producing cannabis by themselves as these users are 
by  definition  not  involved  in  drug  market  transactions  (N=111).  We  also  drop  two  transactions 
characterized by a very high THC concentration (above 30%) as they are more like outliers.
7 We 
further delete two transactions with a missing price and one transaction with a price per gram of 15 
                                                           
6 For further details, see Carpentier et al. (2010). 
7 For these two transactions, the THC concentration is respectively equal to 42.9% and 53%. By comparison, the mean 
concentration of THC is 9.9% for the rest of the sample and the highest THC concentration is 26.5%.  
   
euros,  the  maximum  price  for  the  other  transactions  being  10  euros  per  gram.  Our  final  sample 
includes 275 cannabis users. Among them, 75 use herbal cannabis and 200 use cannabis resin. The 
survey on cocaine was conducted in 2006 on 373 consumers. We delete 27 observations with missing 
values for the price and we also drop from the sample one transaction of one kilogram. Our final 
sample comprises 345 cocaine users, with 49 crack users and 296 powder users. 
  While our surveys concern a specific population of regular users, the use of drugs is growing 
in France. It is currently one of the top-ranking countries in Europe in terms of cannabis consumption 
(Spilka et al., 2007). Cannabis users smoking at least one joint in the year were estimated at 3.9 
million individuals in 2005, while daily smokers of cannabis were estimated at 550,000 individuals 
among the French population. Cocaine use is also strongly increasing nowadays, especially among 
young people (Legleye et al., 2009). According to a general population survey, 250,000 individuals 
experimented with cocaine in 2005 (Beck et al., 2007). 
  Descriptive statistics of drug transactions for the two samples are presented in Table 1. On 
average, the price per gram is 5.45 euros for herbal cannabis and 3.85 euros for cannabis resin, with a 
weight per transaction of 15.03 grams and 31.16 grams respectively. 27.3% of transactions are herbal 
cannabis, 72.7% are cannabis resin and the concentration in THC is slightly higher for herbal cannabis 
than for cannabis resin (10.92% instead of 9.47%). Concerning cocaine, the mean price per gram is 
much higher: respectively 61.86 and 57.53 euros per gram for powder cocaine and crack cocaine. At 
the same time, the quantity per purchase is much lower, respectively 3.14 grams and 5.38 grams. 
Finally,  the  percentage  of  pure  cocaine  (chemically  measured)  is  25.76%  in  the  powder  cocaine 
sample and 33.14% in the crack cocaine sample.
8 
Insert Table 1 
  For each type of drug, Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the price paid per gram of 
illicit substance and the chemic al quality given either by THC or percentage of pure cocaine. 
Interestingly, we only observe a weak positive correlation between price and quality, except for the 
market of cannabis resin where the slope of the linear regression is higher. On the one hand,  the lack 
of correlation could be interpreted in favor of the hypothesis of Caulkins (2007) that illicit drugs are 
“double experience goods.” Poor information on the true quality of the product, from the consumer 
side as well as from the seller side, would lead to large variations in the price corresponding to each 
level of quality.  
Insert Figure 1 
  On the other hand, Figure 1 does not take into account the correlation between quantity and, 
respectively, price and quality. Concerning the former, Ben Lakhdar et al. (2010) report substantial 
bulk-buy discounts for cannabis and cocaine in France. They find a large and significantly negative 
relationship between the logarithm of the price per gram and the log of drug quantity purchased, with 
                                                           
8 We note from Table 1 that the minimum value for percentage of pure cocaine is 0 both for powder and crack cocaine, 
meaning that a few consumers buy an illicit substance without cocaine.  
   
an elasticity of -1.4 for cannabis and -1.5 for cocaine. Concerning the quality–quantity interaction, 
customers will certainly be interested in buying larger quantities of a drug when having access to illicit 
products of better quality. In the same vein, dealers will certainly provide higher quality for larger 
purchases to their more loyal clients, while sales of smaller quantities are more likely to be cut with 
additives and adjuvant. 
  So, this description shows that price, quality and quantity have to be jointly taken into account 
when investigating drug transactions. In what follows, we carry out an efficiency analysis to shed light 
on deviations from the best choices in selling or purchasing illicit substances. 
 
4. A non-parametric double-frontier framework 
  We rely on non-parametric frontier techniques to study the efficiency of agents involved in 
market transactions. In the field of production theory, the most popular non-parametric method is Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which assumes that the production set is convex and free disposable 
(Charnes et al., 1978). In our analysis, we consider the more flexible Free Disposal Hull (FDH) model 
proposed by Deprins et al. (1984) that assumes only free disposability on the production set. As shown 
in Park et al. (1999), the limit distribution of the FDH estimator in a multivariate setup is a Weibull 
distribution. 
  For the presentation of our methodology, we first set aside the role of quantity and consider a 
context where each user buys the same fixed quantity of drug. We then exclusively focus on the 
relationship between quality and the price per gram (or more generally per unit of goods). What is 
needed at this stage is a definition of efficiency. Keeping in mind that each transaction involves both a 
purchaser and a seller, we rely on the following hypotheses:
9  
H1. A buyer paying the lowest price for a given level of quality will be considered as efficient. 
H2. A seller receiving the highest price for a given level of quality will be considered as efficient.  
  Starting from a set of drug transactions, it is then straightforward to identify both efficient 
sellers and efficient buyers in the two-dimensional price–quality space. From the sellers’ perspective, 
all efficient buyers will be located on the outer envelope of agents obtaining the highest price for any 
given level of quality. From the consumers’ perspective, all efficient users will locate on the outer 
envelope obtaining the lowest price for any given level of quality. This FDH double-frontier approach 
is described in Figure 2, each dot corresponding to a specific transaction. The upper frontier indicates 
efficient sellers, while the lower frontier indicates efficient buyers. All transactions belonging to the 
closed set delimited by these two frontiers (frontiers being excluded) are inefficient in the sense that 
some agents perform better than them on the drug market. 
Insert Figure 2 
                                                           
9 For a mathematical definition of the consumption efficiency of multi-attribute products in the price-quality space, see for 
instance Lee et al. (2005) and the references therein.  
   
  Drawing on non-parametric techniques, a few papers have recently investigated such a double-
frontier framework. A seminal contribution has been made by Lins et al. (2005), who assess the value 
range for real-estate units depending on housing features. They analyze the efficiency of buyers and 
sellers involved in residential units located in Rio de Janeiro. Hadley and Ruggiero (2006) also apply a 
double-frontier model to final-offer arbitration in major league baseball. Owners perceive a player’s 
value relative to other players performing as well with lower salaries, while players perceive their 
worth relative to other players who earn more with no better performance. Finally, Mouchart and 
Vandresse (2010) propose a methodology for evaluating the market imperfection and the bargaining 
power of agents acting in a given market, with an application to freight transport. 
  All  these  studies  consider  a  set  of  transactions  characterized  by  a  price  and  a  vector  of 
observed characteristics related to quality for a given quantity of a good. This setting is unfortunately 
irrelevant in the context of drug markets where both quantity and price are jointly determined. As for 
licit goods, purchasers of illegal drugs are likely to obtain significant discounts on price depending on 
the quantity purchased. Several authors have found that the price per gram was a decreasing function 
of  the  quantity  of  drug  purchased,  for  instance  Clements  (2006)  for  marijuana  in  New  Zealand, 
Caulkins and Padman (1993) and Desimone (2006) for marijuana and various other illegal drugs in the 
US, and Ben Lakhdar et al. (2010) for cannabis and cocaine in France.  
  We thus propose a formal framework drawing on FDH techniques to study efficiency of both 
buyers and sellers on drug markets. Our double-frontier approach is in fact potentially applicable to 
any other markets where transactions are characterized by a price-quality-quantity triplet. In what 
follows, we assume that each drug transaction is described by exchanged quantity, drug quality (either 
THC or purity of cocaine) and price per gram. We denote by  R p  the vector of observed unit 
prices,  R q  the vector of exchanged quantities and  R k  the quality vector. We define the 
market (M) by the intersection of two sets, namely the Buyer set (B) and the Seller set (S). They can be 
represented as follows: 
k p q k q p k q p B quality   with    price at    quantity    a buy    could buyer    a   : ) , , ( ) , , (     (1) 
k p q k q p k q p S quality   with    price at    quantity    a   sell   could seller    a   : ) , , ( ) , , (     (2) 
) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( k q p S k q p B k q p M                (3) 
  Some axioms are proposed in order to give some structure to these se ts. Traditionally, free 
disposability, additivity, divisibility or convexity are common axioms for structuring these sets. 
Feasibility of observed transactions is also an accepted and self-evident assumption. We only consider 
feasibility and free disposability to define B and S.  
A1. If a transaction  ) ' , ' , ' ( k q p  is observed, then it is feasible and   
   
  a)   ) , , ( ) ' , ' , ' ( k q p B k q p  
  b)   ) , , ( ) ' , ' , ' ( k q p S k q p    
  c)   ) , , ( ) ' , ' , ' ( k q p M k q p    
A2. If a transaction  ) , , ( ) ' , ' , ' ( k q p B k q p , then for all  ) " , " , " ( k q p  with  ' " p p  ,  ' " k k  and 
' " q q ,  we have  ) , , ( ) " , " , " ( k q p B k q p . 
A3. If a transaction  ) , , ( ) ' , ' , ' ( k q p S k q p , then for all  ) " , " , " ( k q p  with  ' " p p  ,  ' " k k  and 
' " q q ,  we have  ) , , ( ) " , " , " ( k q p S k q p . 
  A1 is self-evident and says nothing more than we accept as feasible what we observed in the 
real world. A2 and A3 are a little more subtle. The free disposability says that if a transaction is 
observed, then any transaction with a higher price, a higher quantity and a lower quality is feasible 
from the buyer's perspective (A2). This means that if we observe a given transaction then the buyer 
could have paid more for at most the same quality. We consider that we have observed the best 
situation, but the worst could have been possible for the buyer. The quantity constraint precludes the 
fact that a higher price could be due to a lower quantity. If unit prices depend on the quantity, then we 
cannot consider that the unit price of a transaction is higher (all things being equal) than another one if 
the quantity of the latter is lower. By analogy, any transaction with a lower price, a lower quantity and 
a higher quality is feasible from the seller’s point of view (A3).   
  The Buyer and Seller sets can be estimated from a sample of observed transactions. Suppose 
that there are  J j ,..., 1  transactions in the sample. For simplicity, we denote by J  either the number 
of observations or an index set for transactions. The Buyer set is represented by: 









j j k k q q p p k q p B   (4) 
and the Seller set is represented by: 









j j k k q q p p k q p S   (5) 
Note that these sets are not convex. By definition, a linear combination of observed transactions is 
precluded since only one observed transaction can be part of the optimal solution, as shown by the last 
constraint of each set.  
  Because we want to measure the extra cost paid by the buyer or the extra gain for the seller, 
we are interested in finding the frontier (or envelope) of the two sets and measuring the distance to this 
frontier. Following Shephard (1953, 1970), each frontier can be deri ved using a distance function. By 
using a price orientation, transactions interior to the envelope of the set B must contract their price 
until they are projected onto the set frontier. In the same way, transactions interior to the envelope of 
the set S must expand their price until they are projected onto the set frontier. The two price distance 
functions can be written as:  
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          (7) 
From (6) and (7) and using the representation of the sets given by (4) and (5), the inefficiencies of 
each  transac tion  J i   is  given  by  the  solutions  to  the  two  following  linear  programs:  
   























































  On  the  supply  side  ( P1), we seek to identify sellers who sell drugs at the highest price per 
gram for a given quality compared to other transactions featured with a lower or equal quality and a 
higher  or  equal  quantity.  This  information  reveals  the  upper  boundary  of  prices  and  defines  the 
potential “over-benefits” from the seller’s perspective. Note that the second constraint on quantity in 
P1 is very important as it controls the impact of quantity on the unit price through bulk-buy discounts. 
From P1, we get a set of amounts  s corresponding to the extra marginal benefit in euros that sellers 
could have obtained had they been efficient. This value is equal to zero for efficient sellers who by 
definition sell at the highest price a product of a given quality. 
  Likewise,  the  lower  boundary  provides  similar  information  from  the  perspective  of  the  
consumer. As shown in P2, the frontier is built from consumers paying the lowest price for a given 
quality compared to transactions featured with a higher or equal quality and lower or equal quantity. 
Again,  the  constraint  on  quantities  in  P2  allows  for  taking  the  discount  effect  into  account.  We 
calculate  how  much  consumers  could  save  in  euros  per  gram  of  drug  purchased  (had  they  been 
efficient), this value being equal to zero for efficient consumers paying the lowest price. 
  To summarize, our formal framework uses non-parametric frontier techniques to determine 
two encapsulating surfaces that enfold all the transactions in a three-dimensional price-quality-quantity 
space.  From the sellers’ perspective, the first frontier is the outer envelope of sellers obtaining the 
highest price for any given level of quality (so an output-oriented FDH model). From the consumers’ 
perspective, the second frontier is the outer envelope of users who obtain the highest quality for a 
given level of price (so an input-oriented FDH model). 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Purchaser and seller inefficiencies in drug markets 
  We apply this double-frontier FDH framework to our data on drug transactions. By solving the 
linear programs P1 and P2, we deduce efficient transactions in drug markets and calculate for each  
   
transaction how many euros per gram could be saved/gained respectively for buyers and sellers with 
respect to efficient agents. We treat each product (herbal cannabis, cannabis resin, powder cocaine, 
crack cocaine) as a separate market.  
For the sake of illustration, Figure 3 presents the efficient transactions both for herbal cannabis 
and cannabis resin. Red dots define the inferior envelope corresponding to efficient consumers. Most 
of  them  are  located  on  the  lower-front  part  of  the  3D-figure.  These  users  have  purchased  a  low 
quantity of drug at a low price, with a high quality for transactions located on the right. Conversely, 
blue dots define the superior envelope indicating efficient sellers. They are more often located in the 
upper-back part of the box. These agents sell large quantities of drug at a high price, drug quality 
being low for transactions located on the left. 
Insert Figure 3 
  We describe in Figure 4 the distribution of buyer and seller inefficiencies expressed in euros. 
According to our data, 35% of buyers of herbal cannabis and 17% of buyers of resin cannabis are 
efficient, meaning that they have paid the lowest price for the quality level they have obtained. From 
the sellers’ perspective, these proportions are respectively equal to 23% and 18%. When considering 
the powder cocaine market, a reversed pattern is observed. There are only 7% of efficient buyers, 
while the proportion of efficient sellers is 13%. There are more efficient agents for crack cocaine, 
respectively 35% of sellers and 28% of buyers. At the same time, the sample is much smaller, which is 
also the case for herbal cannabis.
10 This explains the higher number of efficient transactions on both 
drug markets.  
Insert Figure 4 
  Additional descriptive statistics related to these inefficienc ies are presented in Table 2. Our 
data suggest that buyers of both herbal cannabis and cannabis resin are slightly more efficient than 
sellers of these products. On average, the price per gram paid by cannabis resin and cannabis resin 
consumers could be 1.79 euros per gram and 1.56 euros per gram lower respectively, compared to the 
price paid by efficient buyers. From the sellers’ perspective, the price per gram could be 2.20 euros per 
gram  and  1.83  euros  per gram  higher  respectively  for  herbal  cannabis  and cannabis  resin.  When 
considering crack cocaine transactions, buyers are also more efficient than sellers. The former could 
save 13.21 euros per gram, while the latter could gain 17.43 additional euros per gram. The situation is 
more balanced for powder cocaine, the mean inefficiency being around 21-22 euros for both sellers 
and purchasers. 
  Table 3 shows that the mean inefficiency for cannabis ranges from 33 to 48% of the price per 
gram, while the mean inefficiency for cocaine ranges between 23 and 37%. At an aggregate level, this 
could  significantly  affect  consumers’  expenditure  or  sellers’  income.  Consider  for  instance  the 
cannabis resin market. The 200 purchasers in the survey spent 17,154 euros to obtain 6,231 grams of 
                                                           
10 In France, the number of crack consumers is estimated at less than 9,000.  
   
cannabis. Consumers would have paid 10,064 euros to obtain the same quantity had they all been 
efficient, so a decrease of 41.3%. Similarly, sellers would have obtained 23,314 euros from their drug 
had they all been efficient, which corresponds to a 35.9% increase. For powder cannabis, similar 
calculations show that consumers spent 51,850 euros for 928.6 grams. Users would have paid 33,812.5 
euros had they all been efficient (a 34.8% decrease) and sellers would have received 66,835 euros had 
they all been efficient (a 28.9% increase).  
Insert Table 3 
  So, a first conclusion stemming from this inefficiency analysis is that illicit drug markets do 
not seem to be markets for lemons. Indeed, the average inefficiency of purchasers is lower than the 
average inefficiency of dealers (except for powder cocaine) even though no quality certification on 
products exists for this kind of illicit market. A simple explanation could be that we focus on a sample 
of more or less regular drug users who are likely to have frequent interactions with dealers. Users 
would hence be experienced in drug purchase and could benefit from discounts offered by sellers. 
Experienced users are also expected to have a better knowledge of the illicit products and it would be 
much more difficult for dealers to sell them drug samples of bad quality.  
  Interestingly, we find a reverse pattern for transactions involving powder cocaine. For that 
substance,  the  average  inefficiency  of  purchasers  is  slightly  higher  than  that  of  sellers.  Two 
interpretations may come  to mind. On the one hand, this substance is much more addictive than 
cannabis. So, if users are in need of the drug, then they could be ready to pay a higher price to buy a 
sample of cocaine. Similarly, dealers would be expected to charge higher prices to their customers in 
order to take advantage of their stronger addiction.
11 On the other hand, powder cocaine is a drug that 
can be more easily cut than cannabis. This would offer opportunities for sellers to propose samples of 
bad quality at an excessive price.  
 
5.2. The determinants of inefficiency in drug transactions 
  We now further investigate inefficiency in transactions by explaining the performance of drug 
sellers and purchasers through an econometric analysis. To examine efficiency, almost all studies have 
so far relied on a two-stage approach where efficiency was first estimated through a non-parametric 
analysis,  and  then  the  estimated  inefficiencies  were  regressed  on  a  set  of  covariates  representing 
environmental variables. Censored models were considered for the second stage as all efficient units 
had the same efficiency score.  
As recently highlighted by Simar and Wilson (2007), the difficulty with the classic two-stage 
procedure is that the serial correlation of the efficiency estimates is not taken into account. In the 
                                                           
11 Our data suggest that this interpretation is certainly relevant. We compute the mean of the inefficiency scores as a 
function in relation to the intensity of cocaine consumption during the previous month. We find that the mean efficiency of 
sellers is 21.88 euros when cocaine is sold to daily users, but 19.30 euros when sold to regular users. Conversely, the 
inefficiency from the buyers’ perspective is 2.4 euros lower for regular users compared to daily users (21.19 instead of 
23.62). We further investigate this issue through an econometric analysis in the next subsection.   
   
second stage, the dependent variable under consideration is itself the result of an estimation since the 
efficiency  scores  stem  from  the  non-parametric  estimation  of  an  unobserved  true  frontier.  These 
efficiency scores are serially correlated in an unknown way and the error term in the second-stage 
equation is furthermore correlated with the explanatory variables. The problem is even more severe in 
finite samples, which is usually the case in envelopment analyses.  
As  a  consequence,  standard  inference  methods  are  not  consistent  in  the  second-stage 
regression. We therefore implement  the bootstrap procedure for the two-stage estimation problem 
recently proposed by Silmar and Wilson (2007). The model we seek to estimate is  j j j Z ˆ , 
with  j ˆ  the estimated efficiency (either for sellers or buyers),  j Z  a set of buyers’ characteristics,   
the associated vector of coefficients, and  j a residual. Considering the  J M  observations that are 
characterized by  0 ˆ
j  (they correspond to inefficient agents), we estimate a truncated regression to 
obtain an estimate  ˆ  of   and an estimate  ˆ  of  . 
To  obtain  a  set  of  bootstrap  estimates  ) ˆ , ˆ (
* * , we replicate  N   times  the  following 
procedure.
12  First, we draw a set of  M   residuals  m  with  M m ,..., 1   from the  ) ˆ ; 0 (
2 N  
distribution with left-truncation at  ) ˆ 1 ( m Z . Then, we compute for each m  the new efficiency score 
m m m Z ˆ *  and estimate by maximum likelihood a new truncated regression explaining 
*
m as a 
function of  m Z . In so doing, we obtain a set of coefficients  ) ˆ ; ˆ (
* * . This parametric bootstrap of a 
nonlinear regression model provides inference about  . 
  In what follows, we estimate regressions on efficiency scores only for cannabis resin and 
powder cocaine.
13 By construction, the survey only includes characteristics of users but provides no 
information on the characteristics of the sellers.   We consider the following variables to explain 
inefficiency: gender, age, education, occupation, years of experience in cannabis or cocaine, daily use 
of the drug and the place where users have bought their product. We provide a brief description of 
these variables in Table 3. 
Insert Table 3 
  In both markets, there are many more men than women consuming drugs (77-78%). The mean 
age of cocaine users is slightly higher than that of cannabis users (28.8 instead of 26.7 years old). 
However, age at first use of cannabis resin is lower than that of powder cocaine (17 instead of 20), so 
that years of experience in cannabis use is longer. Both samples comprise low - and high-educated 
users in somewhat similar proportions, but there are many more students among cannabis users (29%) 
than among cocaine users (9%). This may be partly explained by the difference in price between the 
                                                           
12 When exploiting the data, we choose 1,000 bootstrap replications. 
13 We choose to estimate no regression for herbal cannabis and crack because of smaller sample size.  
   
products.  Finally,  69%  of  cannabis users  and  28% of  cocaine  users  are  daily  consumers  and  the 
product was often bought at the dealer’s home (54% for cannabis and 39% for cocaine).  
  We first study the inefficiency of purchasers and sellers respectively. We present the results of 
the two-stage bootstrap procedure in Table 4. Both for cannabis resin and powder cocaine, we find that 
gender and education have no significant effect on inefficiency. Students purchasing drugs are more 
inefficient than the other users. Those buying cannabis could save 0.8 euro per gram had they been 
efficient, while the price paid in excess is 6.6 euros per gram for those buying cocaine. Students may 
have less experience in bargaining when buying the illicit substance, but they could be also ready to 
pay a higher price if they have less frequent access to purchasing opportunities. Cocaine users having a 
paid job also appear to be more inefficient (at the 10% level).
14 An explanation could be that these 
users have less time to find a dealer selling drugs at a low price. At the same time, the paid job 
category could also produce income-related effects.. 
Insert Table 4 
Experienced buyers of cannabis resin are more efficient on average. The survey only provides 
information on the last transaction, but one could imagine that experienced purchasers are more 
accustomed to buying illicit substances. They may have more information o n the product they are 
buying and would therefore be less often swindled. They may also have frequent interactions with the 
same sellers and benefit from products of better quality at the same price.
15 Very similar results are 
observed for regular users of  cannabis, defined as those consuming cannabis at least five days per 
week. Regular users are less inefficient when purchasing drugs, but we also note that transactions are 
more efficient for sellers when purchasers are regular consumers. The repetition of  transactions 
between both agents may be the explanation of the increased efficiency (Reuter and Caulkins, 2004).   
At first sight, it is more surprising that experience or regular consumption play no role in 
efficiency where powder cocaine is concerned. A  difference with cannabis is that cocaine may be 
more easily cut with a range of products such as phenacetin, caffeine, paracetamol, lidocaine or 
diltiazem. It would hence be much more difficult for purchasers to have relevant information on the 
quality of  the drug quantity they purchase. Results from toxicological analysis show that there are 
often two or three additives in the cocaine samples. Our data thus suggest that what matters for 
cocaine is not really who is transacting, the context of the transacti on being apparently much more 
important.  
  We further study this point by estimating an equation where we explain the total inefficiency 
per transaction (defined as the sum of the purchaser’s and seller’s inefficiencies) as a function of 
various characteristics of the transaction.
16 As shown in Table 5,  total inefficiency decreases with 
                                                           
14 The reference category is made up of people who are unemployed or without a professional occupation. 
15 The marginal effect of experience remains low as purchasers save only 0.06 euro per gram per year of experience. 
16 We turn to an OLS regression to explain total inefficiency as there are almost no censored values. There are for instance 
only four total inefficiency scores equal to 0 euro for herbal cannabis (and zero for powder cocaine). Concerning inference, 
we again rely on a bootstrap procedure where we draw some residuals in the normal distribution with the variance  
   
quantity. Clearly, there are greater interests at stake for both sellers and purchasers when transactions 
involve large quantities of a drug. Agents are expected to behave with more professionalism and 
longer negotiations are likely to increase the efficiency of transaction for all participants. Conversely, 
inefficiency  is  positively  correlated  with  drug  quality.  Recalling  that  participants  involved  in  the 
transaction (especially users) have only imperfect information about the drug quality, there may be 
more room for bargaining in such transactions and this would lead to more variability in price.  
Insert Table 5 
Finally, the place where the drug has been purchased plays a role in the explanation of total 
inefficiency. Both for cannabis and cocaine transactions, we find that drug sales in the street are much 
more inefficient than sales made in other places. A similar result is observed for cannabis transactions 
made  in  a  bar,  while  cocaine  exchanges  in  a  scheduled  meeting  are  more  efficient  on  average. 
Although  the  survey  provides  no  information  on  the  identity  of  the  sellers,  it  seems  clear  that 
transactions made in a street are more likely to involve agents who do not know each other. Our 
results hence suggest that the closeness between sellers and customers is an influential factor when 
explaining transaction efficiency. Information definitely affects the performance of agents involved in 
illicit substance markets. 
 
6. Concluding comments 
  In this paper, we have investigated the efficiency of both purchasers and sellers in illicit drug 
markets that are characterized by imperfect information on quality, especially from the purchasers’ 
perspective and to a lesser extent from the sellers’ perspective. For that purpose, we have used unique 
data collected in France in 2005 and 2006 with detailed information about quantity, price and quality 
for a sample of cannabis and cocaine transactions.  
  Drawing on frontier techniques, our contribution proposes a simple method to measure the 
performance of buyers and sellers in a market. For given levels of quality and quantity, a seller is 
defined as efficient when the price paid by the consumer is maximal. In a similar way, a buyer is 
efficient when the price paid to the dealer is minimal. Our measures of efficiency thus indicate how 
many euros sellers could have gained in addition per gram of drug had they been efficient and how 
many euros buyers could have saved per gram of drug had they been efficient. As usual in efficiency 
analysis, our definition of performance is a relative one since each agent is efficient only as a result of 
a comparison to the other agents involved in the drug transactions.  
Our  main  empirical  results  are  twofold.  On  the  one  hand,  we  find  that  buyers  of  illicit 
substances (except for powder cocaine) are slightly more efficient than sellers of these products. The 
mean  inefficiency  for  cannabis  ranges  from  33  to  48%  of  the  price  per  gram,  while  the  same 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
obtained from the OLS regression and calculate simulated values of total inefficiency for each transaction by adding the 
calculated total inefficiency to the residual drawn from the normal distribution. We replicate the procedure 1,000 times to 
obtain a set of bootstrapped estimates of total inefficiency.  
   
percentage ranges between 23 and 37% for cocaine. The difference observed between powder cocaine 
and cannabis is interesting. As the former product may be easily cut, this offers opportunities for 
sellers to charge excessive prices (for a fixed level of quality) and thus improve their efficiency. On 
the  other  hand,  two-stage  truncated  estimates  of  the  efficiency  scores  show  that  regular  users  of 
cannabis  are  more  efficient  on  average.  Experience  thus  plays  an  important  role  in  efficient 
transactions.  Furthermore,  total inefficiency  per transaction  is  increasing  with  drug  quality  and is 
greater when a drug is purchased in the street.  
  When interpreting our results, the composition of our sample has to be kept in mind. It is 
neither representative of the French population, nor of French cannabis and cocaine users. The focus 
on  regular  consumers  living  in  large  cities  could  be  an  explanation  of  the  relative  efficiency  of 
purchasers and sellers that we observe in our data. Infrequent consumers of illicit substances, with 
little experience in drug use, would certainly be less efficient when buying drugs for at least two 
reasons. Firstly, they are expected to be much more affected by quality uncertainty since time is 
needed to acquire a reasonable knowledge of the type of product bought and its purity. Secondly, as in 
any  commercial  relationship,  informational  problems  will  be  lessened  with  the  repetition  of 
transactions between a purchaser and a seller.  
  While quality uncertainty plays a role in the understanding of price setting in illicit drug 
markets, the role of drug addiction has also to be taken into account. Our results show that when the 
drug can be more easily cut (which is evidently the case of cocaine), the mean efficiency of consumers 
is  lower  on  average.  An  interpretation  is  that  inefficiency  is  greater  when  purchasers  have  poor 
information on the product they are buying, but the result could alternatively be explained by drug 
addiction.  Indeed,  several  authors  have  shown  that  cocaine  dependence  was  much  stronger  than 
cannabis  addiction  (Wagner  and  Anthony,  2002).
17  According to the theory of rational addiction 
(Becker and Murphy, 1988, Becker et al., 1991), the reinforcement of drug use would blur the ability 
to be efficient in drug transactions. At the same time, dealers  do not take great advantage of the 
cocaine users’ inefficiency. 
While imperfect information is likely to affect the price-quality ratio in drug markets, we also 
note that the double quality uncertainty (respectively for purchasers and to a lesser extent for sellers) 
does not cause the market to disappear because of a “bad drives out the good” phenomenon. Our data 
show  that  efficiency  on transactions depends  not only  on  individual  characteristics  of sellers and 
purchasers, but also on the context of the transaction. Additional factors such as the proximity between 
sellers and purchasers or the intensity of competition in the market naturally solve the phenomenon of 
“lemons” without the need of certification institutions suggested by Akerlof (1970). 
It  would  hence  be  worthwhile to  have  more  detailed  data  on  drug  transactions  to further 
disentangle the role of imperfect information from the effect of alternative mechanisms like local 
                                                           
17 In the US, Wagner and Anthony find that about 5-6% of cocaine users become cocaine dependent in the first year of use, 
while there is no significant dependence within the first year of use for cannabis.  
   
competition between sellers or repeated interactions between buyers and sellers. Firstly, it would be 
appropriate to have characteristics of both the sellers and the purchasers involved in the different 
transactions.  Secondly,  panel  data  on  drug  transactions  would  be  helpful  to  look  for  unobserved 
heterogeneity at the individual level and to better understand the purchase behavior of drug users. 
Among regular consumers, some of them may buy very frequently small quantities of drug from 
regular dealers while other users may purchase infrequently large quantities from different sellers. 
Thirdly, exhaustive data on drug sales at the local level would be useful to understand the setting of 
prices among dealers and to study the effect of competition (or collusion) on drug prices. 
Unfortunately, the data at hand do not allow us to study the dynamics of purchase and sales on 
illicit substance markets. At the same time, the detailed information on price, quantity and true quality 
(purity) for each transaction makes our empirical analysis unique. In many contributions that have 
investigated the sensitivity of drug consumption to price, prices are very often identified only at the 
state or regional level. Clearly, our data show that there are large variations in price per gram of drug 
for a given level of quality. The law of unique price does not hold in the illicit drug markets, which 
opens the door to an analysis of performance of buyers and sellers in these markets. 
As a final comment, we would like to point out that our methodology can be applied in the 
context of any markets where quality is a choice variable. In such markets, it is straightforward to 
study the efficiency of agents involved in transactions through the non-parametric double-frontier 
framework that we have described in our paper. Automobile, housing and restaurant markets to quote 
but a few examples are potential candidates as they involve goods of different quality levels. For each 
of these markets, the availability of data on transactions with detailed characteristics of the goods sold 
would enable the computing of the distribution of inefficiency between buyers and sellers and a better 
study of the factors influencing the performance of agents in each market. 
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Table 1. Description of drug transactions 
Characteristics  Herbal cannabis  Cannabis resin  Powder cocaine  Crack cocaine 
Price per gram           
  Mean  5.45  3.85  61.86  57.53 
  Standard deviation  1.90  1.65  13.21  14.37 
  Minimum  2.00  0.80  25.00  33.33 
  Maximum  10.00  10.00  100.00  90.00 
Quality          
  Mean  10.92  9.47  25.76  33.14 
  Standard deviation  5.59  3.88  20.65  22.77 
  Minimum  1.20  0.80  0.00  0.00 
  Maximum  22.30  25.30  88.00  86.00 
Quantity         
  Mean  15.03  31.16  3.14  5.38 
  Standard deviation  27.91  57.35  4.13  8.68 
  Minimum  1.00  1.00  0.30  0.50 
  Maximum  200.00  500.00  35.00  50.00 
Number of transactions  75  200  296  49 
Source: OFDT, authors’ calculations. 






   
 
Table 2. Buyers’ and sellers’ inefficiency (in euros per gram) 
Inefficiency  Herbal cannabis  Cannabis resin  Powder cocaine  Crack cocaine 
Buyer         
  Mean  1.79  1.56  22.62  13.21 
  In % of price  33%  41%  37%  23% 
  Standard deviation  1.75  1.29  12.52  13.63 
  Minimum  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Maximum  7.00  8.00  60.00  50.00 
Seller         
  Mean  2.20  1.83  21.27  17.43 
  In % of price  40%  48%  34%  30% 
  Standard deviation  1.75  1.46  13.61  16.76 
  Minimum  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Maximum  7.00  8.00  60.00  50.00 
Number of transactions  75  200  296  49 
Source: OFDT, authors’ calculations 
  
   
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the consumers 
Drug  Cannabis resin  Powder cocaine 
Male  0.78  0.77 
Age  26.68  28.67 
Experience  9.50  8.08 
Education     
  Less than high school  0.31  0.37 
  High school  0.29  0.25 
  More than high school  0.41  0.38 
Occupation     
  Paid job  0.46  0.51 
  Student  0.29  0.09 
  Other  0.25  0.40 
Site     
  Bordeaux  -  0.06 
  Dijon  -  0.06 
  Lille  -  0.12 
  Lyon  0.18  - 
  Marseille  0.15  0.08 
  Metz  0.14  0.18 
  Paris  0.25  0.22 
  Rennes  0.14  0.10 
  Toulouse  0.15  0.18 
Place where the product was purchased     
  Café/bar  0.09  - 
  Nightclub/concert  0.12  - 
  Dealer home  0.54  0.39 
  School  0.15  - 
  Street  0.04  0.16 
  Workplace  0.07  - 
  Other scheduled meeting  -  0.24 
  Other  -  0.22 
Regular/daily consumer  0.69  0.28 
Number of observations  200  296 
Source: OFDT, authors’ calculations 
  
   
Table 4. Two-stage estimates of buyers’ and sellers’ inefficiency 
Variables  Cannabis resin  Powder cocaine 
Sellers  Buyers  Sellers  Buyers 
Constant  1.098*  0.711  25.257***  12.191*** 
  (1.80)  (1.30)  (6.02)  (2.80) 
Male  -0.029  0.101  -1.287  -0.711 
  (-0.15)  (0.53)  (-0.76)  (-0.42) 
Age  0.057**  0.048*  0.138  0.269 
  (2.01)  (1.89)  (0.86)  (1.58) 
Experience  -0.038  -0.062**  -0.130  0.093 
  (-1.17)  (-2.15)  (-0.70)  (0.49) 
Education  (ref: Less than high school)         
  High school  -0.015  0.145  0.806  -1.685 
    (-0.07)  (0.74)  (0.45)  (-0.90) 
  More than high school  -0.062  0.024  -0.690  0.434 
  (-0.28)  (0.13)  (-0.37)  (0.22) 
Occupation  (ref: Other)         
  Paid job   0.107  0.290  -0.715  3.021* 
  (0.47)  (1.53)  (-0.45)  (1.85) 
  Student  0.278  0.815***  -3.578  6.572** 
  (1.04)  (3.45)  (-1.22)  (2.22) 
Regular consumer  -0.530***  -0.614***  -0.593  -1.196 
    (-2.78)  (-3.62)  (-0.37)  (-0.72) 
²  1.435***  1.420***  11.023***  11.255 
  (22.21)  (23.87)  (21.69)  (21.35) 
Number of observations  200  200  296  296 
Source: OFDT, authors’ calculations 
Note : Truncated regression estimates of buyers’ and sellers’ inefficiency (in euros), with bootstrapped standard 
errors (1,000 replications). Significance levels are respectively 1% (
***), 5% (
**) and 10% (
*). Each regression 
also includes specific-city dummies corresponding to the place of purchase. 
  
   
 
Table 5. OLS estimates of total inefficiency 
Drug  Cannabis resin  Powder cocaine 
Constant  2.909***  40.449*** 
  (8.29)  (33.62) 
Total quantity  -0.012***  -1.409*** 
  (-7.74)  (-14.62) 
Quality (%THC or % of pure coke)  0.050**  0.321*** 
  (2.01)  (16.79) 
Place where product was purchased (ref : Dealer’s home)     
  Café/bar  0.575*  - 
  (1.65)   
  Nightclub /concert  -0.102  - 
  (-0.35)   
  School  -0.165  - 
  (-0.67)   
  Street  0.946**  1.933* 
  (2.08)  (1.79) 
  Workplace  0.391  - 
  (1.02)   
  Scheduled meeting (no home dealer)  -  -1.669* 
    (-1.77) 
  Other  -  1.286 
    1.34 
Number of observations  200  296 
Adjusted R²  0.313  0.700 
Source: OFDT, authors’ calculations 
Note : OLS estimates of total inefficiency (sum of buyer and seller inefficiency in euros), with bootstrapped 
standard errors (1,000 replications). Significance levels are respectively 1% (
***), 5% (
**) and 10% (
*). The 
regression also includes specific-city dummies corresponding to the place of purchase.  
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  Source: OFDT, authors’ calculations 




   
 
Figure 2. Buyer/Seller sets and efficient frontiers 
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    Source: OFDT, authors’ calculations  
    Note: drug transactions above 25 grams are not represented. Both price,  
    quantity and quality are normalized to cover the same interval of values.  
 
   
   




















































































































































































































Source: OFDT, authors’ calculations 
Note: inefficiencies correspond to the amount in euros that could be saved or gained. 